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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has always taken a 
deferential stance with regard to the practice of medicine, and maintains 
that it will not interfere with the physicians’ autonomy in this regard.  
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This is otherwise known as the “practice of medicine exception.”  
However, the reality is that it is often difficult to draw a clear line between 
the role of FDA in safeguarding the public from unsafe drugs and the 
autonomy that physicians have in prescribing off-label medication in the 
practice of medicine. 
This article first will first define what constitutes the “practice of 
medicine” and outline the deferential stance position that the FDA has 
adopted towards this practice.  This is supported by a discussion of the 
legal basis for this deferential stance, a position that Congress has also 
reiterated over the years.  The article then explores the prevailing attitudes 
of physicians and patients toward off-label drugs, current regulations 
pertaining to the prescription and advertising of off-label drugs, and 
recent cases that look into restriction of advertising and promoting of off-
label uses of drugs.  Next, the article dives into a balanced and in-depth 
discussion as to whether the FDA should regulate the use of off-label 
drugs, even if it means potentially encroaching and infringing the 
boundaries of the practice of medicine exception.  Lastly, the article sets 
out brief recommendations that may help address the dilemma. 
II. FDA AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
A. Defining the “Practice of Medicine” 
Before plunging into a meaningful discussion of the interaction 
between the FDA and the practice of medicine, it is first appropriate to 
define what the “practice of medicine” encompasses. 
What exactly is the “practice of medicine?”  Is the “practice of 
medicine” whatever that the physicians say it is, or is it a question of how 
to properly treat patients?  If it is the former, then the “practice of 
medicine” clearly lies within the prerogative of physicians and is a field 
in which regulatory bodies have no role intruding upon.  If it is the latter, 
then in the name of safeguarding the public health, perhaps there is some 
foundation for the government to intervene and impose regulations. 
It naturally follows that the definition of “practice of medicine” that 
this paper chooses to adopt will influence all of the arguments 
subsequently raised.  However, there is no clear uniform answer: the 
definitions of “practice of medicine” have fluctuated over time, states and 
jurisdictions.  For instance, an article in the Journal of American Medical 
Association in 1908 defined the practice of medicine simply as the “art 
of healing,” while at the same time, states like New York and Ohio only 
considered that an individual practiced medicine if he administered drugs 
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or performed surgery.1 
Modern legal definitions do not provide much clarity, with different 
states reaching different conclusions on whether the same activity 
involves the practice of medicine.  For example, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals considers a physician’s testimony as a non-treating 
expert witness to fall under the umbrella of the practice of medicine.2  The 
Missouri Court of Appeals however, takes the opposite stance.3  
Therefore, it is difficult to reach a uniform position on certain activities, 
and states and courts have also grappled with defining and delineating the 
boundaries of the practice of medicine.  For instance, it is unclear if 
physicians can rightfully claim to engage in the practice of medicine 
when they review insurance coverage decisions or when non-physicians, 
whose duties overlap with actual physicians, can be said to cross the line 
into practicing medicine.4 
Generally, most state statutes and courts broadly define the practice 
of medicine as involving at least two activities: (1) diagnosing a disease, 
condition or injury; and (2) prescribing, administering or providing a 
treatment for that disease, condition or injury.5 
B. Legal Basis for the Non-Interference with the Practice of 
Medicine 
The FDA has always been clear on its stance: it does not regulate 
the practice of medicine between physicians and patients.6  Although 
there are no existing statutes that specifically outline or guide this 
prohibition, the FDA’s deference to physicians is borne from 
Congressional intent. 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FFDCA”) 
provides the primary source of FDA’s regulatory power over drugs.  
Although the FFDCA, in effect, expanded the federal regulatory 
 
 1  What Constitutes the Practice of Medicine, 299 JAMA 463, 463 (2008); Smith v. 
Lane, 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (24 Hun 632) 634-35 (1881); see also Nelson v. State Bd. of Health, 
57 S.W. 501, 505 (Ky. 1900) (holding that an osteopath is not required to be licensed because 
he does not “prescribe or administer medicine or perform surgery”); State v. Liffring, 55 N.E. 
168, 168-69 (Ohio 1899) (concluding that a treatment is not medical practice unless it includes 
the administration of drugs).  
 2  See Joseph v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. 1991). 
 3  See Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440, 443 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 4  Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of 
Medicine, 53 KAN. L. REV. 149, 162-64 (2004).   
 5  Noah, supra note 4, at 162; Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing: Is It the Practice of Medicine?, 37 J. L. MED. AND ETHICS, 369, 371 (2009).  
 6   Carol Berry, The Dividing Line Between the Role of the FDA and the Practice of 
Medicine: A Historical Review and Current Analysis, HARV. UNIV. LIBRARY (1997). 
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authority, the legislative debates preceding the enactment of the FFDCA 
demonstrated that Congress had never intended for FDA to regulate the 
practice of medicine.7 
During the course of amending the FFDCA in passing the Drug 
Amendments of 1962, Congress once again repeated their stance of 
FDA’s non-interference with the practice of medicine.8  In subsequent 
amendments, provisions were included to reinforce this stance.  Section 
214 of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 
states that “nothing in [the FFDCA] shall be construed to limit or interfere 
with the authority of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer 
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease 
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”9  
Furthermore, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 explicates that “nothing in this section shall be construed to. . .limit 
the practice of medicine.”10  Evidently, this doctrine has been reiterated 
throughout the years, and it is important to note that Congress has adopted 
a similarly deferential stance in protecting professional autonomy in other 
federal healthcare legislation, such as the Medicare statute, Fertility 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 and the Drug Addiction 
Treatment Act of 2000.11 
 
 7  See ROBERT P. BRADY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW & REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK 
AT FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 423-424 (David G. Adams & 
Richard M. Cooper eds., 1st ed. 1997); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 
U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (“[T]he FDA’s mission [is to] . . . regulate . . . without directly 
interfering with the practice of medicine”); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-
Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (“[The] FDA never has had authority to regulate the practice of medicine; 
physicians may use legally marketed drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their 
professional judgment, will best serve their patients”).  
 8  Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  See S. 
Rep. No. 87-1552, at 1998 (1962) (“[T]he . . . [Act] should not interfere with the professional 
function of the physician.  FDA clearance would assure physicians that a drug effectively 
produces certain physiological actions, but the physician, not the FDA, would determine 
whether these specific physiological effects would be useful or beneficial with respect to 
particular patients.”).  
 9  Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396). 
 10  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 
1111(d), 121 Stat. 823, 976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-5a(d)).  
 11  Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 291 
(1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) (“Nothing in [the Medicare statute] shall be construed 
to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine.”); Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 3(i)(1),106 Stat. 3146, 3149 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1)) (“In developing the [federal embryo laboratory] certification program, 
the [Department of Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, 
or requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice of 
medicine in assisted reproductive technology programs.”); Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3502, 114 
Stat. 1222, 1226 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i)) (“Nothing in such regulations or 
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C. The Dilemma that the FDA Faces 
Not surprisingly, there exists an apparent tension between respecting 
physicians’ autonomy in caring for individuals in their practice of 
medicine and the need for the government to regulate such practices and 
safeguard public health.  A common viewpoint amongst physicians is that 
flexibility is crucial for them to judge what is best for each individual 
patient and to provide effective medical care of the highest quality.12  The 
focus of ethical medical teaching has always been to do what is in the 
best interest of the individual patient and to respect each patient’s 
autonomy.  In contrast, the focus with the study of medicine in public 
health lies on the well-being of the entire population at large.13  As Jeffrey 
Drazen—a physician and editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of 
Medicine—pointed out, the practice of medicine is done “on an 
individual basis, with the best interests of the patient foremost in the 
practitioner’s mind.”14 
The tension between the FDA and physicians over the scope of 
practice of medicine has led to various clashes in the field, such as the 
use of pre-approved medical devices or autologous stem cell therapies.  
In the latter, the FDA determined in 2008 that the autologous stem cell 
therapies performed by Regenerative Sciences (a Colorado-based 
medical practice and its  physician owners) constituted a “drug” under 
section 201(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”) 
and a “biological product” under section 351(i) of the Public Health 
Service Act (“PHSA”).15  This move expanded the scope of FDA’s 
regulatory authority over physicians working on stem cell research and 
treatment. 
This paper will focus closely and solely on the tension and 
controversy generated by the use of off-label drugs by physicians. 
 
practice guidelines may authorize any Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or 
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”).  
 12  Solomon J, Raynor DK, Knapp P, Atkin K, The Compatibility of Prescribing 
Guidelines and The Doctor-Patient Relationship: A Primary Care Mixed-Methods Study, 62 
BR J GEN PRACT.  275, 275 (2012). 
 13  BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 12–14 (5th 
ed. 2013); see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 
(2nd ed. 2008). 
 14  Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2195 
(2007). 
 15   Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir. of Compliance and Biologics Quality, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., to Christopher J. Centeno, M.D., Med. Dir., Regenerative Sci., Inc. (July 25, 
2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/ucm091991.htm.  
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III. OFF-LABEL DRUGS 
With respect to the use of off-label drugs, it is crucial to note that 
this tug-of-war over the scope of practice of medicine goes beyond the 
FDA and physicians; there are other important stakeholders deeply 
involved with vested and personal interests.  Third party payers 
increasingly question their duty to expend payments for drugs that have 
not been proven reliably effective, even if these drugs may be the only 
viable treatment option available.16  Pharmaceutical companies are 
interested in expanding their markets and increasing profits by bypassing 
expensive by bypassing expensive clinical trials needed for FDA 
approval.17  The consumers, i.e., the public at large, wants to know that 
drugs that are available in the market are supported by clinical evidence 
and are sold at affordable prices.18  The FDA, being responsible for 
matters that affect the nation’s health and welfare, has an obligation to try 
and balance these seemingly incompatible goals.  In view of these 
conflicting and contradictory interests, where should the line be drawn? 
Before examining the interests of these parties and the weight of the 
arguments for and against regulation of the use of off-label drugs, it 
makes sense to first gain a better understanding of the current state of 
affairs by looking at the current regulations and recent legal cases about 
the use of such drugs. 
A. What Does “Off-Label” Mean? 
The FDA acts on behalf of the federal government and is responsible 
for regulating the entry, sale, promotions, and marketing of drugs in 
United States.  The relevant statute that guides this process is the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which was first enacted in 1938 and 
underwent a series of amendments in 1962.  The FFDCA stipulates a 
“preclearance” regulatory system, which states that “[n]o person shall 
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new 
drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with respect to 
such drug.”19  The approval process for a new drug is long, arduous, and 
highly expensive, involving numerous phases of testing on animals and 
humans. 
The FDA only allows new drugs to enter the marketplace for the 
 
 16  Randall Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking The Role of The FDA, 
358 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1427, 1428 (2008). 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).  See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 
No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1938), amended by Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 
87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f). 
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uses that the pharmaceutical company has applied and managed to get 
approval for.20  Moreover, given that the FDA is also responsible for 
regulating the advertising of such drugs by pharmaceutical companies, it 
requires that all of the approved uses be indicated on a drug’s label.21  
“Off-label” uses of a drug refer to the use or prescription of the drug in a 
manner that has not been authorized by the FDA through its approval 
process for new drugs. 
B. Use of Off-Label Prescription Drugs 
Off-label use can arise in different ways, but it mainly refers to the 
use of drugs in ways that have not been approved by the FDA. Drugs can 
be used for an unapproved indication.  For example, the antipsychotic 
agent, quetiapine, is approved for treating psychosis, but can also be 
prescribed for different medical conditions like depression.  They can 
also be used in unapproved populations, like paroxetine, that is approved 
for treating depression in adults, but is are also used to treat depression in 
children.22  Other ways of using drugs in an off-label manner is to 
prescribe them in a non-approved dosage form or dose regimen.23  
Physicians use drugs for indications outside of the approved uses when 
they extend the use of approved drugs to milder forms of an approved 
indication, or a closely related condition (e.g., the use of anti-asthmatic 
montelukast (commonly known as Singulair) for chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease), or other conditions which have similar physiological 
pathways (e.g., the use of the antidiabetic drug metformin to treat 
polycystic ovarian syndrome) or to conditions that have similar and 
overlapping symptoms.24 
Off-label prescribing is legal and is so common that it can be found 
in almost every field of modern medicine.  In a recent study done in 2006, 
off-label use was shown to account for approximately twenty-one percent 
of all prescriptions of 160 common drugs.25 
The most common medical fields in which off-label drugs are being 
prescribed are oncology, rare diseases, AIDS treatment, and pediatrics; 
while the highest rates of off-label use were for anticonvulsants (seventy-
four percent), antipsychotics (sixty percent), and antibiotics (forty 
 
 20  Rodney Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and The First Amendment, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 81 (2015). 
 21  21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2016).  
 22  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 23  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 24  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 25  David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing 
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166(9) ARCHIVES OF INT’L MED 1021 (2006). 
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percent).26  In 1911, the General Accounting Office found that twenty-
five percent of all anticancer drugs were prescribed off-label and fifty-six 
percent of cancer patients were on at least one drug that was being 
prescribed off-label.27  In the field of pediatric medicine, it has been 
estimated that sixty-two percent of drugs prescribed for children are for 
off-label uses.28 
The use of off-label drugs is so ubiquitous that, not only are they 
being used in most medical specialties, they can be part of guideline-
recommended practices, including in the use of aspirin in diabetes for 
prophylaxis against cardiovascular disease, and can even be a first-line 
therapy in some cases, such as the use of gabapentin for painful diabetic 
neuropathy, in addition to its approved use in the treatment of herpes 
zoster.  Some drugs that pose a high risk of side effects, even for their 
approved uses, are also being used off-label as a last resort, e.g., the use 
of tacrolimus for autoimmune disease, in addition to its approved use in 
transplantation.29 
C. Current Regulations Pertaining to Off-Label Drugs 
Broadly speaking, off-label activities can take three basic forms: off-
label use by consumers at large who purchase these drugs over the 
counter, off-label prescription of drugs by physicians and providers, and 
off-label marketing and promotion by pharmaceutical companies.30  In 
general, off-label prescribing largely influences off-label use by 
consumers, which is in turn influenced greatly by off-label advertising 
and promotion to physicians.  The FDA has sought to regulate and restrict 
the extent of off-label use, mainly by restricting the pharmaceutical 
industry’s marketing practices and, to a much smaller extent, prescribing 
by physicians.31  This unique behavior is presumably driven by the FDA’s 
deferential stance toward the practice of medicine exception, although it 
is debatable whether interfering with the industry’s attempts to promote 
off-label uses to physicians is in effect an indirect interference with the 
practice of medicine. 
 
 26  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427; James O’Reilly and Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of 
Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 
12 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003). 
 27  U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-14, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: 
REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES 
(1991).  
 28  Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States 
Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 83 (2009).  
 29  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 30   O’Reilly and Amy Dalal, supra note 26. 
 31  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428. 
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With regard to prescribing off-label uses, the FDA uses changes in 
drug labeling such as black box warnings to alert physicians that special 
caution is required, and imposes specific restrictions on drug availability 
to curb off-label uses to limited settings.32  The FDA imposes much 
stricter rules on the industry’s marketing practices.  Prior to its 1997 
amendments, the FFDCA expressly forbade the sale of a drug that has 
unapproved uses written on its label or was advertised for unapproved 
uses.33  In other words, pharmaceutical companies were only allowed to 
promote or advertise prescription drugs for uses that were approved by 
the FDA or uses that were “on” the new drug’s label. 
Following major lobbying from pharmaceutical companies, the 
FFDCA underwent a series of amendments in 1997.  Section 401 of the 
FDA’s Modernization Act allows drug manufacturers to distribute 
information regarding the off-label use, on the condition that the 
manufacturer satisfies a list of requirements.34  These requirements 
include only disseminating information that is not abridged, false, 
misleading, or posing a significant health risk to the public; the 
manufacturer has to conduct all clinical research found in the 
disseminated materials, and include in all disseminated materials 
prominent disclaimers clarifying that the information disclosed concerns 
a drug that has not been approved by the FDA for that particular use.35 
The medical industry has always welcomed the exchange of 
scientific information with the drug industry and preferred the open 
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading information relating to all 
beneficial uses for approved products.36  In fact, both the pharmaceutical 
industry and the medical professions believe that the FDA’s regulations 
encroach upon their freedom of speech and freedom to practice medicine 
respectively, and hinder them from keeping up with medical 
breakthroughs and scientific discoveries.37 
D. Off-Label Drugs and the First Amendment 
Given that the full exchange of drug-related information between 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians influences the latter’s medical 
knowledge, it follows that pharmaceutical companies’ freedom of speech 
 
 32  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428. 
 33  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a), 331(d), 321(p) (2000). 
 34  Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401, 111 Stat. at 2356-57 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360a).  
 35  Id. 
 36  Katherine Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A 
Century of FDA Regulation From Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND ENT. L. J. 1177, 153-55 (2007). 
 37  Id. at 153-54.  
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is intimately linked to physicians’ freedom to practice medicine.  Hence, 
in examining the FDA’s possible interference with the practice of 
medicine, we also need to look at how it might do so indirectly by 
restricting the freedom of speech. 
First Amendment challenges to the FDA’s ban on off-label 
promotion have been raised on the grounds that it restricts the freedom of 
speech.  There are two recent cases that directly impacted the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s authority.  In Sorell v. IMS Health, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a Vermont law that restricted the “sale, 
disclosure, and use of pharmacy recordsFalsereveal[ing] the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors” violated First Amendment free speech 
protections.38  To reduce state healthcare costs, Vermont intended to 
hinder drug manufacturers’ ability to use the information gained from the 
prescribing practices of doctors to influence them to prescribe brand-
name drugs instead of generic equivalents.39  The Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing. . . is 
a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment” and that Vermont sought “to achieve its policy objectives 
through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain 
speakers – that is, by diminishing detailers’ ability to influence 
prescription decisions.”40  The court in Sorell stated, “the ‘fear that people 
would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify 
content–based burdens on speech.”41  The court noted that the First 
Amendment’s hostility to paternalistic regulations is applied with “full 
force, when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of 
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers,” which is the same audience 
of the off-label promotions that the FDA is attempting to restrict.42 
Although the Sorrell holding examined pharmaceutical marketing 
and not specifically at the FDA regulatory authority to regulate off-label 
promotion, it predicted how courts would decide the FDA’s ability to 
restrict manufacturers from providing truthful information to physicians 
about off-label uses of approved drugs.43 
This prediction came to fruition in the Second Circuit decision, 
United States v. Caronia, where a pharmaceutical company, and its 
 
 38  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).  
 39  Id. at 560-61. 
 40  Id. at 557, 577. 
 41  Id. at 577. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Ashley Zborowsky, Rethinking Off-Label Regulation in The Wake of Sorrell v. IMS 
Health: Can State Involvement Compensate for Waning State Authority to Curb Commercial 
Free Speech?, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 925, 934 (2012). 
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marketing agents, were caught promoting statements based on their 
personal experiences on the off-label uses of the prescription drug 
Xyrem.44  Given that the statements made by the defendants were truthful 
and not false or misleading, the issue in Caronia revolves purely around 
the legality of the FDA’s restrictions on the act of off-label marketing 
itself.45  At the time Caronia was decided, the key case on commercial 
speech protections was Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v Public 
Service Commission, where the Supreme Court created a four-part test: 
(1) whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment and for 
commercial speech to fall under this category it must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest.46 
Accordingly, in Caronia the Second Circuit applied the four-
pronged commercial speech test set out in Central Hudson.47  
Consequently, the court found that the speech concerned lawful activity 
and was not misleading under the first prong and that the FDA’s interest 
in safeguarding public safety and health was “substantial” under the 
second prong, but the FDA’s regulatory regime failed to advance the 
governmental interest in a direct and material way under the third prong.48  
Further, the court found that the regulation is broader than necessary to 
serve the interest under the fourth prong.49  The Court pointed out that, 
“prohibiting off-label promotion . . . while simultaneously allowing off-
label use ‘paternistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and 
patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information . . . [which] 
could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment 
decisions.”50 
In holding that the restricting commercial speech should be a last 
resort under the First Amendment, the court in Caronia dealt a blow to 
the FDA’s authority to restrict off-label marketing, thereby 
compromising the FDA’s authority to use commercial speech as a proxy 
to regulate undesirable off-label prescriptions.51  The Court’s decision in 
 
 44  Unites States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 45  Id. at 165. 
 46  Central Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980).  
 47  Unites States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 48  Id. at 166. 
 49  Id. at 165-67.  
 50  Id. at 166.  
 51  Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 937; Rodney Smolla, Off- Label Drug Advertising and 
The First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 110 (2015). 
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Caronia brings the FDA closer to confronting its dilemma: how can it 
balance its role in safeguarding public health without interfering with 
physicians’ autonomy to freely practice medicine? 
IV. SHOULD THE FDA REGULATE THE USE OF OFF-LABEL DRUGS? 
Should the FDA regulate the use of off-label drugs in the name of 
public safety, but at the risk of interfering with the practice of medicine, 
which may in turn also endanger public health?  As Helm points out, the 
“double-edged sword of drug regulation can cut deeply both ways.”52 
A. Arguments for Regulations 
There are various reasons for which the FDA should take on a more 
active role in regulating off-label uses.  For starters, in view of the 
conflicting interests of different stakeholders, one can argue that it is the 
role of the FDA as a federal regulatory body to step in to balance these 
interests.53  Interests such as increasing access and availability can be at 
odds with ensuring safety and efficacy.54 
There is also a highly worrying possibility that pharmaceutical 
companies may shun the expensive and complicated approval process by 
“gaming the system.”55  Equipped with the knowledge that they can sell 
their products for a wide range of uses once a singular use has been 
approved, drug companies will choose to seek approval for narrow 
indications.  The relevant clinical trials for narrow indications are less 
expensive and tedious, and they do so with the hope that they can gain 
approval faster and market the product for both its approved and 
unapproved uses.56  In the short term, patients will be placed at risk of 
being harmed by drugs that are being used for purposes that have not been 
proven to be safe and effective.57  In the long run, the underhanded 
shortcuts adopted by pharmaceutical companies to bypass the FDA’s 
strict review and approval process severely undermines the drug efficacy 
requirements, which may end up chipping away at the foundation of 
evidence-based medicine.58 
Save for regulations imposed by the FDA on off-label prescription 
and promotion, drug companies also have minimal incentives to expend 
time, money, and resources to prove the safety and efficacy of the 
 
 52  Helm, supra note 36, at 167.  
 53  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 54  Helm, supra note 36, at 163-64. 
 55  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427-28.  
 56  Helm, supra note 36, at 164. 
 57  O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 307. 
 58  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
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unindicated uses.59  Generic drugs are often produced by smaller 
pharmaceutical firms that do not have the capital or financial backing to 
pay for the expenses that are required to push a drug through the new drug 
application process.  Brand-name drugs that are already widely used off-
label are rarely put through the process by pharmaceutical companies that 
can afford the trials, simply because carrying out such expensive trials 
could potentially end up producing clinical evidence that does not support 
the unapproved use and thus subjects the companies to suffering from 
loss of profits.60  Competing drug manufacturers are also less inclined to 
carry out research about the safety of their own drugs when they see other 
manufacturers making sales from similar drugs sold for the same 
unindicated use, especially since doing research will only lead to lost 
sales from creating delays.61  Thus, there is an obvious need for the FDA 
to step in to impose regulatory control, as market forces provide 
insufficient incentives for drug companies to protect their consumers.62 
Another potential concern is that it would be wholly irresponsible to 
leave it to the pharmaceutical industry and physicians to dictate the use 
of drugs, when pharmaceutical companies have minimal incentives to 
monitor the safety and efficacy of the drugs and individual physicians do 
not have the resources to carry out the extensive and expensive trials 
needed to reliably and accurately prove its efficacy.  In fact, the trials 
reported in the materials that pharmaceutical companies distribute to 
physicians to convince them of the efficacy of off-label uses are often of 
poor quality, industry-sponsored, and are compared to placebos rather 
than existing approved therapies.63  With minimal incentives to drive the 
pursuit of reliable, controlled data on the efficacy of drugs for new 
indications, physicians run the risk of making treatment choices that are 
unsafe.64 
This is especially important as the average consumer expects the 
FDA to have thoroughly screened and evaluated every drug that is 
available in the market for drug safety and efficacy, which is in line with 
the common expectation that FDA is irrefutably responsible for 
safeguarding public health and safety.  By permitting off-label uses to 
occur without subjecting the drugs to rigorous safety checks, the FDA is 
undermining the expectations of the average consumer.65  As Public 
 
 59  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 60  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427. 
 61  O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 307. 
 62  O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 309. 
 63  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428. 
 64  Helm, supra note 36, at 167. 
 65  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428. 
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Citizen, a consumer watchdog group, asserted in a congressional 
submission, deregulating the drug companies will “place the economic 
well–being of multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers above the 
health and safety of the American public and. . .weaken [the] law meant 
to protect the public from needless drug – induced injury.”66  Besides, if 
serious safety concerns about approved uses for drugs already on the 
market are constantly being raised, surely that equates to even more cause 
for concern when it comes to off-label uses that have not gone through 
the rigorous testing process. 
In 2006, a study revealed that 73 percent of off–label prescriptions 
lacked any “firm scientific evidence.”67  This may be driven in part by 
the fact that physicians may hold wrong or inaccurate beliefs of the level 
of evidence supporting a drug’s indications.  A survey done by the 
University of Chicago Medical Centre revealed that physicians were 
more likely to (incorrectly) believe that a specific use of a drug was FDA–
approved if they themselves prescribed it for that indication.68  This 
underscores the potential risk of off-label uses, even if that risk is 
unintentional, and emphasizes the need for the FDA to step in and oversee 
drug prescribing practices.69 
Proponents for imposing regulation go even further and claim that 
the untested use of drugs is unethical and potentially unsafe.70  After all, 
isolated case reports published in peer–reviewed journals telling the 
successes of unapproved uses cannot compare to controlled and rigorous 
clinical trials and strict FDA scrutiny of the drug’s safety profile.71 
A case in point is the increased risk of heart attack and stroke that 
were brought about from Merck’s promotion of the off-label use of 
rofecoxib (Vioxx) in treating rheumatoid arthritis, outside of its FDA-
approved use for relieving pain.72  What makes the situation more 
aggravating is that these risks were only discovered after widespread use 
 
 66  O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 305-06. 
 67  Radley et. al, supra note 25, at 1023.  
 68  Rick Nauert, Off-Label Use May Be Off-Track, PSYCH CENTRAL, (Aug. 24, 2009), 
http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/08/24/off-label- use-may-be-off-track/7926.html.  
 69  Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in Balancing the 
Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 426 
(2011) (“[W]hile off-label prescribing can be very beneficial to some patients, this common 
practice can also be unnecessary and, in some cases, very risky.”).  
 70  Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved 
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 202 (1999). 
 71  See Charles Marwick, Implementing the FDA Modernization Act, 279 JAMA 815 
(1998). 
 72  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429; John Cairns, The Coxibs and Traditional 
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs: A Current Perspective on Cardiovascular Risks, 
23(2) CAN. J. CARDIO, 125 (2007). 
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of the drug among patients who didn’t stand to benefit much from 
choosing rofecoxib over the existing treatment of choice.73 
There are other notorious examples where the use of off-label 
medications have gone awry and caused more harm than good.  The E1 
prostaglandin analogue, Misoprostol, was approved in 1988 for the 
prevention and treatment of gastric ulcers, but was later prescribed off-
label to induce labor for elective abortions.74  Unfortunately, it was later 
found to cause uterine rupture in pregnant women.75  Thalidomide is 
another tragic example; it was initially used as a sedative and was later 
approved to treat leprosy, but it was also prescribed for off-label purposes 
such as cancer and AIDS.76  It was found that when pregnant women 
consumed the drug, their babies were born with severe and permanent 
limb deformities.77  These examples serve to highlight the dangers of 
permitting un-indicated uses of drugs that have not been approved by the 
FDA. 
B. Arguments Against Regulations 
There is some force in the argument that science should dictate the 
practice of medicine, not law.  As Beck and Azari say, “[f]or a product to 
have the most effective potential benefits, law and regulation. . .must 
follow, not precede science.”78  It often takes a prolonged period of time 
for regulations to be put in place because the FDA approval process is 
notorious for being time-consuming, arduous and expensive.79  The 
process for approval in 2000 was estimated to take between seven to ten 
years.80  In practical terms, this means that medical discoveries in the field 
of practice often happen at a faster pace than the FDA approval process.81  
For instance, the approved use for aspirin was for pain relief as an anti-
 
 73  Carolanne Dai, Randall Stafford, Caleb Alexander, National Trends in 
Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since Market Release: Non-Selective Diffusion of a 
Selectively Cost-Effective Innovation, 165 ARCHIVES OF INT’L MED. 171 (2005). 
        74  Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA 
Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. S. L. REV.1135, 1168 (2005). 
 75  Id. 
 76  Shuang Zhou, Fengfei Wang, Tze-Chen Hsieh, Joseph Wu, Erxi Wu, Thalidomide – A 
Notorious Sedative to a Wonder Anticancer Drug, 20 CURR MED CHEM 4102 (2014). 
 77  Fox, supra note 74, at 1168; see also Joseph G. Contrera, The Food and Drug 
Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious will 
International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927, 935 n.33 
(1995). 
 78  James M. Beck & Elizabeth Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: 
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 79 (1998). 
 79  O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304. 
 80  O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304. 
 81  Fox, supra note 74, at 1165.  
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inflammatory drug but it was prescribed by physicians off-label for many 
years to reduce the risk of heart attacks and it wasn’t until 1998 that the 
FDA finally approved such use.82 
Furthermore, while new additions may eventually be included on the 
list of approved uses following a supplemental new drug application, this 
is more of an exception than the norm.  The FDA approval process is 
immensely expensive and a recent study done by Tufts Centre for the 
Study of Drug Development pegs the cost of developing a new drug that 
ultimately gains market approval at $2.6 billion.83  As mentioned earlier, 
drug companies either do not have the financial backing to do so and even 
if they do, they have no incentives to carry out expensive trials that could 
produce undesirable outcomes for their drugs and thus reduce profits.84  
Given that there are minimal incentives for pharmaceutical companies to 
push for FDA approval for off-label uses of drugs, it is not surprising that 
the unapproved additions may never be added onto the label. 
In treating patients, there are often many variations in clinical 
histories and the best form of treatment for one patient with a condition 
may not necessarily be the most ideal treatment of choice for a different 
patient with the exact same condition.  For physicians to act in the best 
interest of the individual patient, the physician needs to have the freedom 
to prescribe the most appropriate medication for that particular patient, 
even if it is for a use that has not been approved. In fact, an off-label drug 
is sometimes the first-line of therapy or the recommended drug in clinical 
guidelines.  In 1994, George Lundberg of the American Medical 
Association said when he testified before Congress and stated, 
“prescribing FDA-approved drugs for off-label uses often is necessary 
for optimal patient care.”85  For a physician to be so restricted as to be 
unable to prescribe what is appropriate or even necessary to treat the 
patient would entail a regrettable step backwards and a clear, unwanted 
intrusion into the practice of medicine. 
Although, approved drugs for treating a medical condition may 
exist, the current treatments available may be unsatisfactory.86  There are 
still many medical conditions for which we there is no cure, and these 
conditions range from infectious diseases such as AIDS to hereditary 
 
 82  Peter J. Gross & Linda S. Svitak, Drug and Device Litigation in the 21st Century, 27 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 271, 286 (2000).  
 83  Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS 
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/ 
complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
 84  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427-28. 
 85  Beck & Azari, supra note 78, at 79. 
 86  Fox, supra note 74, at 1165. 
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conditions such as cystic fibrosis and even cancer.87  As a result, a 
practitioner’s freedom to prescribe an off-label drug that is not approved 
by the FDA has advantages: it drives innovation in clinical practice and 
enables physicians to adopt new practices based on emerging clinical or 
research evidence that may be insufficient for FDA approval or have yet 
to be presented to FDA for approval.  In doing so, physicians offer much-
needed hope to patients who have run out of viable approved options 
amongst approved drugs. 
A perfect example of an area of medicine in which patients and 
physicians often must rely on innovative uses of off-label drugs is the 
area of oncology.  A drug may be approved to treat Cancer A but has not 
been approved to treat Cancer B.  If the principle of pathophysiology 
behind both cancers is the same, as is the case with most cancers, it is 
likely that the drug will also be of benefit to a patient afflicted with 
Cancer B.  Therefore, it is medically appropriate for physicians, in the 
absence of other safe or effective options, to resort to a last ditch attempt 
in prescribing these drugs for unapproved ways.88  In fact, the use of off-
label drugs in the field of oncology is so extensive that the American 
Society of Oncology wrote a letter to the FDA in 1998 stating that “the 
labeling of anticancer products frequently presents an incomplete or even 
inaccurate picture of the current state of medical knowledge. . .for 
virtually every cancer drug, appropriate medical usage differs from the 
terms of the product labeling.”89 
Another group of patients for whom off-label drugs may be life 
savings are patients who suffer from “orphan” conditions.90  Federal Law 
defines “orphan” diseases as those diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 
Americans, including debilitating conditions such as Lou Gehrig’s 
disease and cystic fibrosis.91  The expected profits to be gained from such 
a small group of consumers is dwarfed by the anticipated costs of 
conducting research and carrying out expensive clinical trials for 
“orphan” conditions, which accounts for the reluctance of drug 
 
 87  Fox, supra note 74, at 1165. 
 88  Fox, supra note 74, at 1166. 
 89  Letter from John R. Durant, Executive Vice President, Am. Soc’y of Clinical 
Oncology, to Michael A. Friedman, Acting Comm’r, FDA (July 21, 1998), available at 
https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/dockets/98n0222/c000039.pdf.  
 90  See O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 305 (citing Karen Bradshaw, The Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997: Is It the Answer to the 
Off-Label Advertising Debate?, 12 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 295 (1998)). 
 91  See, e.g., I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA’s Final Guidance on 
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 193 (1998). 
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companies to invest in making drugs to treat these diseases.92  Hence, it 
is hardly surprising that patients afflicted with orphan conditions rely 
heavily on the use of off-label drugs, so much so that the Abbey Meyers, 
President of the National Organization for Rare Diseases reports that 
“90% of [such patients] must rely on ‘off-label uses to have any treatment 
at all.’”93 
It is understandably misleading to think that patient populations who 
rely heavily on off-label drugs are restricted only to small, isolated 
groups.  Large patient populations such as pregnant women and children 
are also immensely reliant on off-label use of drugs too.  It is much more 
tricky, problematic and expensive to conduct controlled clinical human 
trials on children and pregnant women, and drug companies lack the 
financial motivation to pursue such research.94  The American Academy 
of Pediatrics estimates that 80% of drugs prescribed for children are being 
prescribed for off-label uses.95  Without off-label drugs, these 
significantly large patient populations will be left out in the cold without 
any treatment at all.96 
In light of these arguments, it becomes clear that the unethical 
human experimentation objection to off-label drug use is severely 
undermined, especially when one draws a distinction between medical 
research and medical practice.  Medical practice refers to the diagnosis 
and treatment of the individual patient while medical research refers to 
the general development of scientific knowledge of the human body, for 
which tests must be carried out under strict controls and with patient’s 
informed consent.97  Since off-label use often arises with the primary goal 
of benefitting the individual patient, rather than the desire to advance the 
general progress of scientific knowledge, it falls squarely into the field of 
medical practice, not medical research.98  Bearing this in mind, the 
objection to “unethical human experimentation” is less persuasive and 
may even be misplaced. 
There are also benefits that can be derived from lifting restrictions 
 
 92  O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304. 
 93  Off-Label Drug Use and FDA Review of Supplemental Drug Applications, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the H. Comm. 
on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 1 (1996) (statement of Abbey S. Meyers, 
President, Nat’l Org. of Rare Disorders).  
 94  Fox, supra note 74, at 1165. 
 95  Robert Levine, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL 241 (Yale U. Press, 2nd ed. 
1986).  
 96  William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 
48 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993).  
 97  George J. Annas, Questing for Holy Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in 
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297, 323 (1996).  
 98  Fox, supra note 74, at 1169.  
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on data sharing between drug companies and physicians.  Precisely 
because the use of off-label drugs is so widespread, the dissemination of 
accurate information by drug companies can increase physicians’ access 
to the most updated literature on these drugs, which in turn allows them 
to provide the optimal care for their patients.99  Given advances in 
information technology made in the last decade, physicians are finding it 
increasingly difficult to keep abreast of the deluge of information that is 
available in every medical journal regarding the efficacy of off-label uses 
in treating a variety of conditions and there is the risk of physicians 
missing out on a key study or crucial piece of research that may influence 
his treatment choices.100  Having drug companies present physicians with 
information on how and when to use a drug for un-indicated uses in a 
concise and truthful manner may be beneficial for both patients and 
physicians.101  The fear that pharmaceutical companies will insidiously 
sway the minds of unknowing physicians with misleading information 
can also be allayed.  Physicians themselves believe that off-label 
promotion to physicians should be without restrictions, in view of the 
physicians’ general familiarity with the FDA–approval process and their 
capability to independently assess the legitimacy of a drug 
manufacturer’s claims.102  The Second Circuit in Caronia astutely 
observed that “as off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, it does not 
follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage 
would. . . reduc[e] patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”103 
An explicit argument must be made for the autonomy of physicians 
and for their freedom to practice medicine without undue interference 
from the FDA.  All the aforementioned arguments support this point 
directly or indirectly, e.g. off-label drugs benefit patients’ and physicians’ 
act in the best interests of patients in their practice of medicine.  As Beck 
and Azari puts it succinctly, “if the physician’s considered professional 
judgment is that a particular use of a particular product is the best 
treatment for a particular patient, professional responsibility demands 
that this course of treatment be followed.”104  In fact, physicians may be 
guilty of malpractice if they fail to act according to the off-label standard 
 
 99  Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protections of Off-Label Drug and 
Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 165 (2011).  
 100  Id. at 150 (“[Physicians not paid by a drug or device manufacturer] are free to tout to 
benefits of off-label uses in any way to any listener.”).  
 101  Richard C. Ascroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal Foundation Cases on 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices in the United States, 34 IND. L. REV. 95, 99 (2000).  
 102  Helm, supra note 36, at 153-154.  
 103  Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.  
 104  Beck & Azari, supra note 78, at 100.  
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of care.105  In 2007, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) passed 
Resolution 918 that not only permits physicians to use off-label drugs, 
but also encourages it when clinical evidence, expert consensus opinion, 
or accepted standards of care support such uses.106  Furthermore, the 
resolution calls for support for “the autonomous clinical decision making 
authority of a physician.”107  Many in the medical community also adopt 
this stance, and feel that the government should not hinder a physician’s 
freedom to practice medicine when using an off-label drug is optimal for 
patient care.108 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Given the FDA’s dilemma in choosing to safeguard public safety 
versus overstepping its boundaries and intervening with the practice of 
medicine, there is merit in briefly exploring a few solutions that could 
possibly address both of these concerns. 
A. State Regulations 
Unlike the FDA, states have traditionally been recognized to have 
broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine in order to protect the 
safety, health, and welfare of the people within the state.109  In contrast to 
the skepticism that FDA faces for intervening with the practice of 
medicine, states have always been able to exercise this authority in a 
variety of ways; including adopting vaccination and quarantine laws, as 
well as establishing modern licensing requirements for medical 
practitioners.110  Courts have also upheld a broad range of state laws that 
regulate the practice of medicine—making it clear that the states have the 
authority to do so.111  Since regulating the practice of medicine is a space 
that has always been reserved for states, states should be involved in 
examining off-label prescribing practices.112  There is a caveat, however, 
that different states must cooperate to ensure successful regulation of off-
label activity, or else state residents can choose to travel to other states 
 
 105  Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label 
Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 969 (2007).  
 106  Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939. 
 107  Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939. 
 108  Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939. 
 109  Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 51 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 427, 446 (2015). 
 110  Noah, supra note 3, at 159.  
 111  Noah, supra note 3, at 159.  
 112  Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in Balancing the 
Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 429 
(2011).  
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with fewer restrictions; hence, defeating the goal of implementing state-
based restrictions.113 
B. Drugs Not Approved in United States  
Another option that can be explored but has not yet gained much 
traction is for the FDA to speed up approval of new indications of drugs 
that have already been approved in other countries. 
The European equivalent of the FDA is the European Medicines 
Agency, and pharmaceutical companies have to satisfy both the different 
approval processes set out by both the EMA and the FDA in order for 
new drugs to be marketed in the European Union and the United States 
respectively.114  This can be costly, duplicative, and time consuming.  
There has been academic debate calling for the cooperation of both the 
FDA and EMA to streamline and align the approval processes, which will 
facilitate drug development and allow for quicker (and less expensive) 
access without necessarily compromising the safety and efficacy of 
drugs.115 
Even if the approval processes in both agencies were to remain 
different, there is value in permitting the use of drugs that have been 
approved by either agency (i.e. reciprocity), consequently reducing delay 
or the waste of duplicated resources.116  A case of meningitis outbreak in 
Princeton in 2013 highlights the feasibility of reciprocity: seven cases of 
the type B strain were diagnosed in Princeton, and while there exists a 
vaccine (Bexsero) for treatment of the outbreak the FDA has yet to 
approve its use.117  This same vaccine has been approved by EMA since 
January 2013 and is available in Europe and Australia, and after lobbying 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the FDA gave special 
permission to import and use the vaccine.118  In fact, reciprocity is the 
major premise behind a bill introduced by Senator Ted Cruz and Mike 
Lee, “Reciprocity Ensures Streamlined Use of Lifesaving Treatments Act 
 
 113  Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 94. 
 114  The FDA and Slower Cures, W.S.J. (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424052748703766704576009512990553104. 
 115  Lynn Howie et al, A Comparision of FDA and EMA Approval: Implications for Drug 
Development and Cost of Care, 27 ONCOLOGY 1195, 1195 (2013).  
 116  Reform Options, FDAREVIEW.ORG, http://www.fdareview.org/09_reform.php#3 (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2016).  
 117  Paul Howard and Yevgeniy Feyman, If a Drug Is Good Enough for Europeans, It’s 
Good Enough for Us, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/ 
2014/02/14/if-a-drug-is-good-enough-for-europeans-its-good-enough-for-us/.  
 118  Conor Friedersdorf, Ted Cruz’s Best Idea for Overhauling The FDA, THE ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/ted-cruzs-best-idea-
for-overhauling-the-fda/421158/.  
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of 2015.”  The proposed bill will allow for “reciprocal marketing 
approval of [drugs]. . . that are authorized to be lawfully marketed 
abroad” in a list of selected countries.119  There have also been previous 
bills, such as Speeding Access to Already Approved Pharmaceutical Act, 
that attempt to tackle this “drug lag”.120 
Legislation which aim to push for approval or the speeding up of 
approval of new indications of drugs already approved in other countries, 
such as the bill discussed above, is a feasible measure that warrants more 
attention. 
C. FDA to Explore Other Options 
Instead of viewing the FDA as an opposing regulatory body whose 
sole aim is to set up indiscriminate barriers for the use of off-label drugs 
at every turn, it is worthwhile looking to the FDA to adopt a role where 
it works alongside physicians and pharmaceutical companies to ensure 
that consumers derive the maximum benefit from off-label uses.  For 
instance, the FDA may consider taking it upon itself to collect post-
marketing data from users in a methodical manner to assess and balance 
harms and benefits of off-label uses.  Alternatively, the FDA can collate 
and analyze existing evidence from any reliable non-randomized 
controlled clinical trial before distributing its findings to practitioners.121 
As the Second Circuit in Caronia suggested, there are many 
regulatory mechanisms other than restricting speech that FDA could 
impose to advance its interests—e.g. providing guidance to doctors and 
patients to help differentiate misleading and inaccurate promotion from 
truthful information; developing disclaimer systems to warn consumers 
and providers; developing “safety tiers within the off-label market. . . to 
distinguish between drugs”; or making it mandatory for drug 
manufacturers to list all anticipated indications when they first submit a 
new drug for the approval process—which could “enabl[e] physicians, 
the government and patients to track a drug’s development.”122  The last 
suggestion has also been echoed by critics like Stafford, in the hope that 
this will preempt any attempt on the part of pharmaceutical companies to 
circumvent the rigorous testing process for what is most likely the 
 
 119  BILL FOR RECIPROCITY ENSURES STREAMLINED USE OF LIFESAVING TREATMENT ACTS 
OF 2015, http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Bills/20151211_FDA.pdf.  
 120  Alexander Gaffney, Bill Wants Drugs Approved in Europe to be Available More 
Quickly to US Patients, REGULATOR AFFAIRS PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/03/20/21778/Bill-Wants-Drugs-
Approved-in-Europe-to-be-Available-More-Quickly-to-US-Patients/.  
 121  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429. 
 122  Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, at 167-68.  
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primary use.123 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is no easy solution to the existing dilemma of how FDA can 
strike a balance between safeguarding public safety and respecting 
physicians’ autonomy to practice medicine freely without any 
intervention.  This article has highlighted the numerous arguments 
supporting, as well as resisting the implementation of regulations by the 
FDA.  Fortunately, there exist a few solutions that we can explore in 
isolation or combination to help address this dilemma; such as looking 
into allowing EMA-approved indications to be applied here in the U.S. 
or speeding up the FDA approval process.  It remains to be seen if the 
aforementioned suggestions will ever gain sufficient traction to achieve 
tangible outcomes, but it is important nonetheless to encourage 
intellectual discourse in this area, with the hope that patients can benefit 
from the even the smallest steps taken in the right direction. 
 
 
 123  Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429. 
